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Incorporating fairness motives into the Impulse Balance Equilibrium concept: an application 
to experimental 2X2 games 
 
 
Abstract: Substantial evidence has accumulated in recent empirical works on the limited ability of the 
Nash equilibrium to rationalize observed behavior in many classes of games played by experimental 
subjects. This realization has led to several attempts aimed at finding tractable equilibrium concepts 
which perform better empirically, often by introducing a reference point to which players compare the 
available payoff allocations, as in impulse balance equilibrium (IBE) (SELTEN & CHMURA, 
forthcoming) and in the inequity aversion model (FEHR & SCHMIDT, 1999). The purpose of this paper 
is to review these recent reference point literature and to propose a new, empirically sound, hybrid 
concept.  
 
From efficiency to equality: the “distributive” reference point  
 
In recent years experimental economists have accumulated considerable evidence that steadily 
contradicts the self-interest hypothesis embedded in equilibrium concepts traditionally studied in game 
theory, such as Nash’s. The evidence suggests that restricting the focus of analysis to the strategic 
interactions among perfectly rational players (exhibiting equilibrium behavior) can be limiting, and that 
considerations about fairness and reciprocity should be accounted for.  
In fact, while models based on the assumption that people are exclusively motivated by their material 
self-interest perform well for competitive markets with standardized goods, misleading predictions arise 
when applied to non-competitive environments, for example those characterized by a small number of 
players (cf. FEHR & SCHMIDT, 2000) or other frictions. For example KAHNEMAN, KNETSCH & 
THALER (1986) find empirical results indicating that customers are extremely sensitive to the fairness 
of firms’ short-run pricing decisions, which might explain the fact that some firms do not fully exploit 
their monopoly power. 
 
One prolific strand of literature on equity issues focuses on relative measures, in the sense that subjects 
are concerned not only with the absolute amount of money they receive but also about their relative 
standing compared to others. BOLTON (1991), formalized the relative income hypothesis in the context 
of an experimental bargaining game between two players. 
KIRCHSTEIGER (1994) followed a similar approach by postulating envious behavior. Both specify the 
utility function in such a way that agent i suffers if she gets less than player j, but she’s indifferent with 
respect to j’s payoff if she is better off herself. The downside of the latter specifications is that, while 
consistent with the behavior in bargaining games, they fall short of explaining observed behavior such 
as voluntary contributions in public good games.  
 
A more general approach has been followed by FEHR & SCHMIDT (1999), who instead of assuming 
that utility is either monotonically increasing or decreasing in the well being of other player, model 
fairness as self-centered inequality aversion. Based on this interpretation, subjects resist inequitable 
outcomes, that is they are willing to give up some payoff in order to move in the direction of more 
equitable outcomes. More specifically, a player is altruistic towards other players if their material 
payoffs are below an equitable benchmark, but feels envy when the material payoffs of the other 
players exceed this level. To capture this idea, the authors consider a utility function which is linear 
in both inequality aversion and in the payoffs. Formally, for the two-player case: 
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Where ࢞  are player 1 and player 2’s payoffs respectively and ࢼ  are player i’s inequality 
parameters. The second term in the equation is the utility loss from disadvantageous inequality, 
while the third term is the utility loss from advantageous inequality. Due to the above restrictions 
imposed on the parameters, for a given payoff ࢞࢏, player i’s utility function is maximized at 
, and the utility loss from disadvantageous inequality (࢞ ) is larger than the utility 
loss if player i is better off than player j (࢞ ). 
 
Fehr and Schmidt show that the interaction of the distribution of types with the strategic 
environment explains why in some situations very unequal outcomes are obtained while in other 
situations very egalitarian outcomes prevail. In referring to the social aspects introduced by this 
utility function, one could think of inequality aversion in terms of an interactive framing effect 
(reference point dependence).  
 This payoff modification has proved successful in many applications, mainly in combination with 
the Nash equilibrium concept, and will therefore be employed in this study, although in conjunction 
with a different equilibrium type, as will be explained in the next section. 
 
The “psychological” reference point 
 
The predictive weakness of the Nash equilibrium is effectively pointed out by EREV & ROTH 
(1998), who study the robustness and predictive power of learning  models in experiments 
involving at least 100 periods of games with a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies. They 
conclude that “…in some of the games the [Nash] equilibrium prediction does very badly” and that 
a simple learning model can be used to predict, as well as explain, observed behavior on a broad 
range of games, without fitting parameters to each game. A similar approach, based ex-post and ex-
ante comparisons of the mean square deviations, will also be employed in this paper to assess to 
what extent the proposed hybrid model improves the fit of several games. 
 
Based on the observation of the shortcomings of mixed Nash equilibrium in rationalizing observed 
behavior in many classes of games played by experimental subjects, an alternative tractable 
equilibrium has been suggested by SELTEN & CHMURA (forthcoming). IBE is based on learning 
direction theory (SELTEN & BUCHTA, 1999), which is applicable to the repeated choice of the 
same parameter in learning situations where the decision maker receives feedback not only about 
the payoff for the choice taken, but also for the payoffs connected to alternative actions. If a higher 
parameter would have brought a higher payoff, the player receives an upward impulse, while if a 
lower parameter would have yielded a higher payoff, a downward impulse is received. The decision 
maker is assumed to have a tendency to move in the direction of the impulse. IBE, a stationary 
concept which is based on transformed payoff matrices as explained in the next section, applies this 
mechanism to 2x2 games. The probability of choosing one of two strategies (for example Up) is 
treated as the parameter, which can be adjusted upward or downward. It is assumed that the second 
lowest payoff in the matrix is an aspiration level determining what is perceived as profit or loss. In 
impulse balance equilibrium expected upward and downward impulses are equal for each of both 
players simultaneously. 
 
The main result of the paper by Selten and Chmura is that, for the games they consider, impulse 
balance theory has a greater predictive success than the other three stationary concepts they 
compare it to: Nash equilibrium, sample-7 equilibrium and quantal response equilibrium. While 
having the desirable feature of being a parameter-free concept as the Nash equilibrium, and of 
outperforming the latter, the aspiration level framework (to be described) expose the theory to a 
critique regarding the use of transformed payoffs in place of the original ones for the computation 
of the equilibrium.  
 
The aspiration level can be thought of as a psychological reference point, as opposed to the social 
one considered when modeling inequality aversion: the idea behind the present work is that of 
utilizing IBE but replacing the aspiration level with inequity aversion (social) parameters. The 
motivation follows from the realization that in non-constant sum games (considered here) subjects’ 
behavior also reflects considerations of equity. In fact, while finite repetition does little to enlarge 
the scope for cooperation or retaliation, non-constant sum games offer some cooperation 
opportunities, and it seems plausible that fairness motives will play an important role in repeated 
play of this class of games. A suitable consequence of replacing the aspiration level framework with 
the inequality aversion one is that the original payoffs can be utilized (and should, in order to avoid 
mixing social and psychological reference points). 
 
Experimental setup: IBE 
 
The table in Appendix A shows the 12 games, 6 constant sum games and 6 non-constant sum games 
on which Selten and Chmura have run experiments, which have taken place with 12 independent 
subject groups for each constant sum game and with 6 independent subject groups for each non-
constant sum game. Each independent subject group consists of 4 players 1 and 4 players 2 
interacting anonymously in fixed roles over 200 periods with random matching. In summary: 
 
Players: I={1,2} 
Action space: {U,D}x{L,R} 
Probabilities in mixed strategy: {ܲ ,1-ܲ } and {ܳ ,1-ܳ } ௎ ௎ ௅ ௅
௎, ܳ௅
Sample size: (54 sessions) x (16 subjects) = 864 
Time periods: T=200   
 
 In Appendix A, a non-constant sum game next to a constant sum game has the same best reply 
structure (characterized by the Nash equilibrium choice probabilities ܲ ) and is derived from the 
paired constant sum game by adding the same constant to player 1’s payoff in the column for R and 
2’s payoff in the row for U. Games identified by a smaller number have more extreme parameter 
values than games identifies by a higher number; for example, Game 1 and its paired non-constant 
sum Game 7 are near the border of the parameter space (ܲ 0.1   and ܳ 0.9), while Game 6 and 
its paired non-constant sum Game 12 are near the middle of the parameter space (ܲ  and 
=0.6).  
௎ ؆ ௅ ؆
௎ ؆ 0.5
ܳ௅
 
As pointed out, IBE involves a transition from the original game to the transformed game, in which 
losses with respect to the natural aspiration level get twice the weight as gains above this level. The 
impulse balance equilibrium depends on the best reply structure of this modified game, which is 
generally different from that of the original game, resulting therefore in different predictions for the 
games in a pair. 
 
The present paper utilizes the data on the experiments involving 6 independent subject groups for 
each of the 6 non-constant sum games (games 7 through 12 in Appendix A). As anticipated above, 
this class of games is particularly conceptually suitable to the application of the inequality aversion 
framework. Further, in completely mixed 2x2 games, mixed equilibrium is the unambiguous game 
theoretic prediction when they are played as non-cooperative one-shot games. Since non-constant 
sum games provide incentives for cooperation, such attempts to cooperation may have influenced 
the observed relative frequencies in Selten’s experiment. Along these lines, it is particularly 
relevant to see whether inequality aversion payoff modifications can help improve the fit with 
respect to these frequencies.       
 
The application of inequality aversion parameters to Impulse balance equilibrium provides an 
opportunity for testing Fehr & Schmidt’s fairness model in conjunction with the IBE, which  is 
itself a simple yet fascinating concept which has proven to be empirically successful in fitting the 
data in many categories of games and is nevertheless parsimonious due to the straight-forward 
formulation and parameter-free nature. By including a fairness dimension to it, the hope is to supply 
favorable empirical evidence and provide further stimulus to expand the types of games empirically 
tested. 
 
Formally, this involves first modifying the payoff matrices of each game in order to account for the 
inequality parameters ( β ,α ), than creating the impulse matrix based on which the probabilities are 
computed. In order to clarify the difference between the reference point utilized in Selten and 
Chmura (the aspiration level) and that utilized in this paper it is useful to start by summarizing the 
mechanics behind the computation of the IBE.  
 
Let’s consider the normal form game depicted in Figure 1 below, 
 
 
 
Fig.1: structure of the 2x2 games (arrows point in the direction of best replies) 
 
      L (ܳ ) ? R (1-ܳ௅) ௅
ܽ௅ ௅  ௎ ܽோ ௎ ௎ +  ܿ  ;  ܾ  
↑ 
  ;  ܾ + ݀      
                     ↓ 
ܽ௅ ஽ ஽ ܽோ ோ ஽  ;  ܾ  + ݀    + ܿ   ;  ܾ  
? 
 
where  ܽ௅, ܽோ, ܾ௎, ܾ஽ ൒ 0
             ܿ௅, ܿோ, ݀௎, ݀஽ ൐ 0
ܿ௅  ோ ௎, ݀஽
௅, ܽோ
௎, ܾ஽
ݏ௜ ௅, ܽோ ௎, ܾ஽ሻ 
௜
௜
௜ ௜
  
 
 
 and ܿ  are player 1’s payoffs in favor of U,D while ݀  are player 2’s payoffs in favour of 
L,R respectively. Note that player 1 can secure the higher one of ܽ  by choosing one of his pure 
strategies, and player 2 can similarly secure the higher one of ܾ . Therefore, the authors define 
the natural aspiration levels for the 2 players are given by: 
 =max(ܽ )   for i=1   and  ݏ௜=max(ܾ for i=2 
the transformed game (TG) is constructed by leaving player i’s payoff unchanged if it is less or 
equal to ݏ  and by reducing the difference of payoffs greater than si by the factor ½. Algebraically, 
calling x the payoffs, 
 
if x ≤ ݏ  => x’= x 
if x > ݏ  => x’= x-½(x-ݏ ) 
 
If after the play, player i could have obtained a higher payoff with the other strategy, she receives an 
impulse in the direction of the other strategy, of the size of the foregone payoff in the TG.  
 
 
  
 
Fig.2:Impulses in T.G. in the direction of unselected strategy        
 
      L (ܳ )  R (1-ܳ ) ௅ ௅
௎ ܿோ0 ; ݀ * * ; 0 
ܿ௅ ஽* ; 0 0 ; ݀ * 
 
 
The concept of impulse balance equilibrium requires that player 1’s expected impulse from U to D 
is equal to the expected impulse from D to U; likewise, pl.2’s expected impulse from L to R must 
equal the impulse from R to L. Formally, 
 
௎ܲܳோܿோ ஽ܳ௅ܿ௅
௎ܲܳ௅݀௎ ஽ܳோ݀஽
௎ܲ
* =ܲ * 
*=ܲ * 
 
Which, after some manipulation, can be shown to lead to the following formulae for probabilities: 
=
*/**/*
*/*
ddducrcl
crcl
+  
ܳ௅= 
*
*
*
*1
1
dd
du
cr
cl+
  
 
Experimental setup: equity-driven Impulse Balance Equilibrium 
 
Replacing the aspiration level framework with the inequality aversion one doesn’t require the 
computation of the TG based on aspiration level framing, as the original payoffs are now modified 
by including the inequality parameters (β ,α ). Formally, recalling that: 
 
ट࢏ ൌ ࢞࢏ െ ࢻ࢏࢓ࢇ࢞൛࢞࢐ െ ࢞࢏, ૙ൟ െ ࢼ࢏࢓ࢇ࢞൛࢞࢏ െ ࢞࢐, ૙ൟ 
 
 
  
 
Fig.4: structure of the 2x2 games accounting for inequality aversion 
 
      L (ܳ )       R (1-ܳ௅) ௅
ܽ௅ ௅   െ ߙ௜݉ܽݔሼܾ௎ െ ܽ௅ െ ܿ௅ , 0ሽ െ ߚ௜݉ܽݔሼܽ௅  ൅ ܿ௅ െ ܾ௎, 0ሽ
ܾ௎ െ ߙ௜݉ܽݔሼܽ௅  ൅  ܿ௅   െ ܾ௎, 0ሽ െ ߚ௜݉ܽݔሼܾ௎ െ ܽ௅ െ ܿ௅  , 0ሽ
ܽோ െ ߙ௜݉ܽݔሼܾ௎ ൅ ݀௎ െ ܽோ, 0ሽ െ ߚ௜݉ܽݔ൛ܽோ െ ܾ௎ െ ݀௎ , 0
ܾ௎ ௎ െ ߙ௜݉ܽݔሼܽோ െ ܾ௎ െ ݀௎, 0ሽ െ ߚ௜݉ܽݔሼܾ௎ ൅ ݀௎ െ ܽோ, 0ሽ
 +  ܿ ;
 
ൟ ;  
+ ݀        
                      
ܽ௅ െ ߙ௜݉ܽݔሼܾ஽  ൅ ݀஽   െ ܽ௅, 0ሽ െ ߚ௜݉ܽݔሼെܾ஽ െ ݀஽ ൅ ܽ௅, 0ሽ
ܾ஽ ൅ ݀஽ െ ߙ௜݉ܽݔ൛ܽ௅ െ ܾ஽ െ ݀஽௅, 0ൟ െ ߚ௜݉ܽݔሼെܾ஽ െ ݀஽ ൅ ܽ௅, 0ሽ
ܽோ ோ െ ߙ௜݉ܽݔሼܾ஽ െ ܽோ െ ܿோ  , 0ሽ െ ߚ௜݉ܽݔሼܽோ ൅ ܿோ െ ܾ஽, 0
ܾ஽ െ ߙ௜݉ܽݔሼܽோ ൅ ܿோ   െ ܾ஽, 0ሽ െ ߚ௜݉ܽݔ൛ܾ஽ െ ܽோ െ ܿோ,   , 0ൟ
  ;  
 
+ ܿ ሽ; 
 
 
Based on these payoffs, the previous section’s computations can be conducted in order to find the 
impulse balance mixed strategy equilibria corresponding to specific values of β  andα . 
 
Two measures of the relative performance of the I.A.-adjusted Impulse Balance concept:   
best fit and predictive power 
 
Results in terms of Best fit 
 
The preceding analysis served as an introduction to the more systemic method utilized in the next 
paragraphs to assess the descriptive and predictive success of the “pure” impulse balance 
equilibrium in comparison to the proposed Inequality Aversion hybrid.  
Following a methodology which has been broadly utilized in the literature to measure the adaptive 
and predictive success of a point in a Euclidean space, the squared distance of observed and 
theoretical values is employed (cf. Erev & Roth, 1998 and Selten & Chmura). More precisely, the 
first part of the analysis consists, for each of the 6 non constant sum games, of a grid search with an 
MSD criterion on the ( β ,α ) parameter space to estimate the best fitting parameters, i.e. those that 
minimize the distance between the model and the data.  
Algebraically, the mean over the 6 games in the best fit row will be given by:  
 
1
6
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ଵଶ
௜ୀ଻
 
୳୧ െ P୳ሻଶ ൅ ሺf୪୧ െ Q୪ሻଶwhere ܯܵܦ௜ is the mean of game i’s squared distances ሺf  
 
The inequality aversion parameters used in the hybrid model must satisfy the constraints ii αβ ≤
and 0 1≤i≤ β . levant parameter space under investigation is then given, for each  The re β ,by values 
α ∈[ β ,0.5]. Graphically the parameter space can be represented as follows are as follows:  
 
 
Figure 1: The correspondence between β  and α  
 
 
׊ β א ሾ0,0.35ሿ , α א ሾ β , 0.5ሿ 
 
   
 
 
 Table 1, a summary of the results of the explanatory power of the two models is presented for 
d 
he reason of the two-fold comparison is that not only it is meaningful to assess whether the hybrid 
 i 
een 
In
each non constant sum game, starting from the transformed or the original payoffs, respectively. 
The comparisons are made both within game class in column 5 (e.g. within transformed game i, 
i=7,...,12), and across game class in the last column (e.g. between original game i and transforme
game i).  
 
T
model can better approximate the observed frequencies than the I.B. concept, but it is especially 
important to answer the question: does the hybrid concept applied to the original payoffs of game
outperform the “pure” I.B. applied to the transformed payoffs? In other words, since the inequality 
aversion concept overlaps to a certain extent to that of having impulses in the direction of the 
strategy not chosen, applying the inequality aversion adjustment to payoffs that have already b
transformed to account for the aspiration level will result in “double counting”. It is therefore more 
relevant to compare the best fit of  hybrid equilibrium on O.G. (see rows highlighted in blue)  to 
that obtained by applying impulse balance equilibrium to T.G.  
  
 
 
 
Table 1: Ex-post (best fit) descriptive power of hybrid model vs I.B. equilibrium  
 
 
 
 
FREQUENCY 
 [fu; fl] 
N.E. 
[Pu;Ql]   
BEST FIT  I.B.+I.A. 
 [Pu;Ql]  
 ( β ,α ) 
IBE 
[Pu;Ql]   
 (0;0) 
I.B.+I.A 
ê  
IBE? 
O.G.+I.B.+I.A.
ê 
T.G.+IBE? 
TG7 [.141;.564]    (0;0)  634][.104;.634] [.104;. NO 
 
n.a. 
OG7 [.141;.564] [.091;.909]  [.099;.568] (.054;.055) 
  
[.091;.500] YES YES 
TG8 [.250;.586]   (.043;.065) [.258;.561] YES n.a. [.270;.586]
  
OG8 [.250;.586] [.182;.727]  [.257;.585] (.006;.468) 
 
[.224;.435] YES YES 
TG9 [.254;.827]  180;.827] (.07;.10) [.188;.764] YES n.a. [.
 
OG9 [.254;.827] [.273;.909] [.232;.840] (.325;.327)  [.162;.659] YES 
 
YES 
TG10 [.366;.699]  [.355;.759] (.089;.134)  [.304;.724] ES n.a. 
 
Y
OG10 [.366;.699] [.364;.818]  [.348;.717] (.250;.254)  
 
[.263;.616] YES YES 
TG11 [.311;.652]  357;.652] (.012;.018)  [.354;.646] YES n.a. [.
 
OG11 [.311;.652] [.364;.727]  [.344;.644] (.001;.425)  
 
[.316;.552] YES YES 
TG12 [.439;.604]  496;0.575]  (0;0) [.496;.575] NO n.a. [.
  
OG12 [.439;.604] [.455;.636]  [.439;.604] (.022;.393) 
 
[.408;.547] YES YES 
 
spection of Table 1 suggests a strong positive answer to the following two relevant questions 
t of 
natural payoffs, namely the original and the transformed respectively? 
In
regarding the ability of the proposed concept to fit the observed frequencies of play: within the 
same class of payoffs (TG or OG), is the descriptive power of the hybrid concept superior to tha
the IBE? And, perhaps more importantly, is this still true when the two concepts are applied to their 
The last two columns of Table 1 contain the answers to the two questions, based on a comparison of 
the mean squared deviations of the predicted probabilities from the observed frequencies under the 
esults in terms of Predictive power 
nce of the inequality aversion-adjusted impulse balance 
quilibrium concept is studying its ex ante predictive power. This is done by partitioning the data 
 
f the 
al of 
MSD scores (100*Mean-squared Deviation) organized as follows: each of 
e first 6 columns represents one non-constant sum game, while the last column gives the average 
two methods.    
 
 
R
 
The next step in evaluating the performa
e
into subsets, and simulating each experiment using parameters estimated from the other 
experiments. By generating the MSD statistic repeatedly on the data set leaving one data value out
each time, a mean estimate is found making it possible to evaluate the predictive power o
model. In other words, the behavior in each of the 6 non-constant sum games is predicted without 
using that game’s data, but using the data of the other 5 games to estimate the probabilities of 
playing up and down. By this cross-prediction technique (known as jackknifing), one can evaluate 
the stability of the parameter estimates, which shouldn’t be substantially affected by the remov
any one game from the sample. Erev & Roth (1998) based their conclusions on the predictive 
success and stability of their learning models by means of this procedure, and it has therefore been 
employed in this work.  
 
Table 2 shows summary 
th
MSD over all games, which is a summary statistic by which the models can be roughly compared. 
The first three rows present the MSDs of the Nash equilibrium and of the I.B. equilibrium 
predictions (for β =0=α ) on the transformed and original payoffs respectively. The remaining 
three rows display MSDs of the I.A.+I.B. model on the original payoffs: in the fourth row, the 
parameters are se arate  estimated for each game (12 parameters in total);  in the fifth row, the 
estimated 2 parameters that best fit the data over all 6 games (and over all but Game 7) are 
employed (the same two
p ly
β ,α  that minimize the average score over all games are used to comput
the MSDs for each game); in the last row the accuracy of the prediction of the hybrid model
showed when behavior in each of the 6 games is predicted based on the 2 parameters that best fit 
the other 5 games (and excluding Game 7).   
 
 
e 
 is 
Table 2: MSD scores of the IBE and of the proposed equilibrium concept 
G 12  Mean 
 
Model  G 7  G 8  G 9  G 10  G 11 
Nash equilibrium, O.G. 
0 parameters (0;0) All games 
G8‐12  
 
6.076 
 
1.225 
 
.354 
 
.708 
 
.422 
 
.064 
 
1.475 
.555 
I.B. equilibrium, T.G.  
0 parameters  (0;0)All g
         
ames 
  G8‐12
 
.315 
 
.035 
 
.416 
 
.224 
 
.094 
 
.205 
 
.215 
.195 
I.B. equilibrium, O.G.           
0 parameters(0;0)  All games 
G8‐12  
 
.330 
 
1.174 
 
1.825 
 
.878 
 
.497 
 
.209 
 
.819 
.917 
Hybrid by game, O.G. 
 12 parameters      All games 
2  G8‐1
 
.090 
 
.003 
 
.031 
 
.033 
 
.056 
 
.000 
 
.035 
.025 
Hybrid best fit,   O.G.  
2 parameters 
            All games  (.157,.160)  
G8‐12  (.252,.257)  
 
 
.746 
- 
 
 
.178 
.042 
 
 
.428 
.098 
 
 
.152 
.033 
 
 
.140 
.173 
 
 
.030 
.034 
 
 
.279 
.076 
H
2
ybrid pre
 paramete
dict,  O.G. 
rs         All games      
                           Without G 7 
 
2.220 
- 
 
.238 
.044 
 
.585 
.149 
 
.186 
.033 
 
.141 
.189 
 
.031 
.035 
 
.567  
.09 
 
 
ab eT le 2 summarizes further evid nce in favor of the newly developed equity-driven impulse 
alance equilibrium. One can see from the third row that if the parameters of inequality aversion are 
 
5 
If one doesn’t include 
 
 
b
allowed to be fit separately in each game, the improvements in terms of reduction of MSD are
significant, both with respect to the Nash and impulse balance equilibrium. 
Moreover, even when restricting the number of parameters to 2 (common to all games, cf. row 
“best fit”), the mean MSD is still more than five times smaller than Nash’s. 
the extremely high MSD reported in both cases for Game 7 (for reasons discussed below), the gap
actually increases, as the hybrid concept’s MSD becomes more than seven times smaller than 
Nash’s. With respect to the overall MSD mean of the IBE, when considering all games the hybrid 
has a higher MSD, although the same order of magnitude (.279 and .215 respectively). If one 
focuses only on games 8-12, again we have a marked superiority of the hybrid model over the IBE,
as the MSD of the latter is more than twice that of the new concept.  
A similar pattern is appears in the last row of the table, concerning the predictive capability: if 
Game 7 is excluded, the values are in line with the ones obtained in the fifth row, indicating 
stability of the parameters who survive the cross-validation test. 
 
One comforting consideration regarding the appropriateness of the exclusion of Game 7 comes 
from the widespread anomalous high level of its MSD score in all rows of the table, which for both 
Nash and Hybrid predict is about four times the corresponding mean level obtained over the six 
games. It is plausible that this evidence is related to the location of Game 7 in the parameter space. 
It is in fact located at near the border, as previously pointed out, and therefore may be subject to the 
overvaluation of extreme probabilities by the subjects due to overweighting of small probabilities.       
   
An addition to the present work, which is currently in progress, considers incorporating fairness 
motives in the quantal response equilibrium notion, one that has recently attracted considerable 
attention thanks to its ability to rationalize behavior observed in experimental games. In addition to 
providing an interesting case for comparison, it should also allow to shed light on the suspected 
anomalous nature of Game 7. 
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 Appendix A: Games utilized in Selten & Chmura; in this paper only games 7 to 12 (non-constant 
sum games) are investigated.  
 
 
 
